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Abstract. Multi-protocol attacks due to protocol interaction has been
a notorious problem for security. Gutman-Thayer proved that they can
be prevented by ensuring that encrypted messages are distinguishable
across protocols, under a free algebra [1]. In this paper, we prove that a
similar suggestion prevents these attacks under commonly used operators
such as Exclusive-OR, that induce equational theories, breaking the free
algebra assumption.
1 Introduction
It is quite common for users to simultaneously run multiple cryptographic pro-
tocols on their machines. For instance, a user might connect to a web site using
https that uses the SSL protocol and also connect to another remote server us-
ing the SSH protocol. It is also quite common for a single protocol to consist of
multiple sub-protocols.
A protocol might be secure when running in isolation, but not necessarily
when running parallely with other protocols. In fact, Kelsey et al. [2] showed that,
for any given secure protocol, it is always possible to create another protocol to
break the original protocol. In an interesting practical study, Cremers analyzed
30 published protocols and reported that 23 of them were vulnerable to multi-
protocol attacks [3]. Thus, they are a genuine and serious threat to protocol
security.
In an outstanding work, Guttman-Thayer proved that, if encrypted messages
are tagged with distinct protocol identifiers, multi-protocol attacks can be pre-
vented [1]. For instance, if the notation [t]k denotes message t encrypted with
key k, then encryptions in the SSL protocol should resemble [SSL, t1]k1 and those
in the SSH protocol should resemble [SSH, t2]k2 . With such tagging in place, it
will not be possible for an attacker to replay encryptions across protocols, since
users would check and verify the tags upon receipt of messages.
However, Guttman-Thayer considered a basic protocol model where opera-
tors for constructing messages (such as encryption algorithms) do not induce
equations between syntactically different messages, such as [t]k = [k]t. Most
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2 Sreekanth Malladi
“real-world” protocols such as SSL violate this assumption, and use operators
that do induce equational theories, such as Exclusive-OR (XOR). It is extremely
important to revisit Guttman-Thayer result under these operators, since such
operators have been demonstrated to cause new attacks on protocols that are
not possible under a free algebra [4].
This is the problem we consider in this paper: We prove that a tagging scheme
that is similar to Guttman-Thayer’s prevents multi-protocol attacks under the
XOR operator and the ACUN theory induced by it. Our proof strategy is general,
and could be used for other equational theories such as ACU,Idempotence and
ACU,Inverse. We give some intuitions for this in our conclusion.
Organization. In Section 2, we introduce our formal framework including the
term algebra, protocol model, constraint satisfaction, security properties and
our main protocol design requirements. In Section 3, we prove a lynchpin lemma
that we use in Section 4 to achieve the main result. We conclude with a discussion
of future and related works.
2 The Framework
In this section, we formalize our framework to model and analyze protocols.
2.1 Term Algebra
We will start off with the term algebra. We derive much of our concepts here
from Tuengerthal’s technical report [5] where he has provided an excellent and
clear explanation of equational unification.
We denote the term algebra as T (F,Vars), where Vars is a set of variables,
and F is a set of function symbols or operators, called a signature. The terms in
T (F,Vars) are called F -Terms. Further,
– Vars ⊂ T (F,Vars);
– (∀f ∈ F )(arity(f) > 0∧t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F,Vars)⇒ f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (F,Vars)).
The set of nullary function symbols are called constants. We assume that
every variable and constant have a “type” such as Agent , Nonce etc.
We define F as StdOps ∪ {XOR} ∪ Constants, where,
StdOps = {sequence, penc, senc, pk , sh}.
penc and senc denote asymmetric and symmetric encryption operators re-
spectively. pk and sh denote public-key and shared-key operators respectively.
We assume that they will always be used with one and two arguments respec-
tively, that are of the type Agent .
We use some syntactic sugar in using some of these operators:
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sequence(t1, . . . , tn) = [t1, . . . , tn],
penc(t, k) = [t]→k ,
senc(t, k) = [t]↔k ,
XOR(t1, . . . , tn) = t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn.
We will omit the superscripts ↔ and → for encryptions if the mode of en-
cryption is contextually irrelevant.
We will write “t in [t1, . . . , tn]” if t ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}. We will write ti ≺t tj if
ti, tj in t, t = [t1, . . . , tn] and i < j.
We define the subterm relation as follows: t @ t′ iff t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn) where
f ∈ F and t @ t′′ for some t′′ ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}.
We will use functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() on a single term
or sets of terms, that return the variables, constants and subterms in them
respectively. For instance, if T is a set of terms,
SubTerms(T ) = {t | (∃t′ ∈ T )(t @ t′)}.
We will now introduce equational theories and equational unification.
Definition 1. [Identity and Equational Theory] Given a signature F , and
set of variables Vars, a set of identities E is a subset of T (F,Vars)×T (F,Vars).
We denote an identity as t ∼= t′ where t and t′ belong to T (F,Vars). An equa-
tional theory (or simply a theory) =E is the least congruence relation on T (F,Vars),
that is closed under substitution and contains E. i.e.,
=E :=
{
R | R is a congruence relation on T (F,Vars), E ⊆ R, and
(∀σ)(t ∼= t′ ∈ R⇒ tσ ∼= t′σ ∈ R)
}
For the signature of this paper, we define two theories, STD and ACUN.
The theory STD for StdOps-Terms is based on a set of identities between
syntactically equal terms, except for the operator sh:
{[t1, . . . , tn] ∼= [t1, . . . , tn],
h(t) ∼= h(t),
sigk(t) ∼= sigk(t),
pk(t) ∼= pk(t),
[t]k ∼= [t]k,
sh(t1, t2) ∼= sh(t2, t1)}.
The theory ACUN is based on identities solely with the XOR (⊕) operator:
{t1 ⊕ (t2 ⊕ t3) ∼= (t1 ⊕ t2)⊕ t3, t1 ⊕ t2 ∼= t2 ⊕ t1, t⊕ 0 ∼= t, t⊕ t ∼= 0}.
We will now describe equational unification.
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Definition 2. [Unification Problem, Unifier, Unification Algorithm]
If F is a signature and E is a set of identities, then an E-Unification Problem
over F is a finite set of equations
Γ =
{
s1
?
=E t1, . . . , sn
?
=E tn
}
between F -terms. A substitution σ is called an E-Unifier for Γ if (∀s ?=E t ∈
Γ )(sσ =E tσ). UE(Γ ) is the set of all E-Unifiers of Γ . A E-Unification Problem
is called E-Unifiable iff UE(Γ ) 6= {}.
A complete set of E-Unifiers of an E-Unification Problem Γ is a set C of
idempotent E-Unifiers of Γ such that for each θ ∈ UE(Γ ) there exists σ ∈ C
with σ ≥E θ, where ≥E is a partial order on UE(Γ ).
An E-Unification Algorithm takes an E-Unification Problem Γ and returns
a finite, complete set of E-Unifiers.
Hence forth, we will abbreviate “Unification Algorithm” to UA and “Unifi-
cation Problem” to UP.
Two theories =E1 and =E2 are disjoint if the signatures used in the identi-
ties E1 and E2 have no common operators. UAs for two disjoint theories may
be combined to output the complete set of unifiers for UPs made using oper-
ators from both the theories, using Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm
(BSCA) [6].
BSCA first takes as input a (E1 ∪ E2)-UP, say Γ , and applies some trans-
formations on them to derive Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 that are sets of E1-UPs and E2-UPs
respectively. It then combines the unifiers for Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 obtained using E1-
UA and E2-UA respectively, to return the unifier(s) for Γ (see Appendix A,
Def. 7). Further, if Γ is (E1 ∪ E2)-Unifiable, then there exist Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 that
are E1-Unifiable and E2-Unifiable respectively.
We give a more formal and detailed explanation of BSCA in Appendix A
using an example UP, for the interested reader.
2.2 Protocol Model
Our protocol model is based on the strand space framework [7].
Definition 3. [Node, Strand, Protocol] A node is a tuple 〈±, t〉 denoted
±t where t ∈ T (F,Vars). A strand is a sequence of nodes. A protocol is a set of
strands.
For instance, consider the NSL⊕ protocol [8]:
Msg 1. A→ B : [NA, A]pk(B)
Msg 2. B → A : [NA ⊕B,NB ]pk(A)
Msg 3. A→ B : [NB ]pk(B)
Then, NSL⊕ = {roleA, roleB}, where,
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roleA = [+[A,NA]pk(B),−[NA ⊕B,NB ]pk(A),+[NB ]pk(B)], and
roleB = [−[A,NA]pk(B),+[NA ⊕B,NB ]pk(A),−[NB ]pk(B)].
A semi-bundle S for a protocol P is a set of strands formed by applying
substitutions to some of the variables in the strands of P : If P is a protocol,
then, semi-bundle(S, P )⇒ (∀s ∈ S)((∃r ∈ P ;σ)(s = rσ)).
For instance, S = {sa1, sa2, sb1, sb2} below is a semi-bundle for the NSL⊕
protocol with two strands per role of the protocol:
sa1 = [+[a1, na1]pk(B1),−[na1 ⊕B1, NB1]pk(A1),+[NB1]pk(B1)],
sa2 = [+[a2, na2]pk(B2),−[na2 ⊕B2, NB2]pk(A2),+[NB2]pk(B2)],
sb1 = [−[A3, NA3]pk(b1),+[NA3 ⊕ b1, nb1]pk(A3),−[nb1]pk(b1)],
sb2 = [−[A4, NA4]pk(b2),+[NA4 ⊕ b2, nb2]pk(A4),−[nb2]pk(b2)].
(Note: lower-case symbols are constants and upper-case are variables).
We will assume that every protocol has a set of variables that are consid-
ered “fresh variables” (e.g. Nonces and Session-keys). If P is a protocol, then,
FreshVars(P ) denotes the set of fresh variables in P . We will call the constants
substituted to fresh variables of a protocol in its semi-bundles as “fresh con-
stants” and denote them as FreshCons(S). i.e., If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
FreshCons(S) =
{
x |
(∃r ∈ P ; s ∈ S;
σ;X
)(
(rσ = s) ∧ (X ∈ FreshVars(P ))∧
(x = Xσ) ∧ (x ∈ Constants)
)}
.
We assume that some fresh variables are “secret variables” and denote them
as SecVars(P ). We define “SecCons()” to return “secret constants” that were
used to instantiate secret variables of a protocol: If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
SecCons(S) =
{
x |
(∃r ∈ P ; s ∈ S;
σ;X
)(
(rσ = s) ∧ (X ∈ SecVars(P ))∧
(x = Xσ) ∧ (x ∈ Constants)
)}
.
For instance, NA and NB are secret variables in the NSL⊕ protocol and
na1, na2, nb1, nb2 are the secret constants for its semi-bundle above.
We will lift the functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() to strands,
protocols and semi-bundles. For instance, if P is a set of strands and r ∈ P ,
then,
SubTerms(r) = {t | (∃t′)((〈 , t′〉 in r) ∧ (t ∈ SubTerms(t′)))},
SubTerms(P ) = {t | (∃r ∈ P )(t ∈ SubTerms(r))}.
We also define the long-term shared-keys of P as LTKeys(P ), where,
LTKeys(P ) = {x | (∃A,B)((x = sh(A,B)) ∧ (x ∈ SubTerms(P )))}.
To achieve our main result, we need to make some assumptions. Most of our
assumptions are reasonable, not too restrictive for protocol design and in fact,
good design practices.
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As noted in [9], we first need an assumption that long-term shared-keys are
never sent as part of the messages in the protocol, but only used as encryption
keys. Obviously, this is a safe and prudent design principle.
Without this assumption, there could be multi-protocol attacks even when
Guttman-Thayer suggestion of tagging encryptions is followed. For instance,
consider the following protocols:
P1 P2
1. a→ s : sh(a, s) 1. a→ b : [1, na]sh(a,s)
Now the message in the second protocol could be decrypted and na could be
derived when it is run with the first protocol.
To formalize this assumption, we define a relation interm denoted b on terms
such that,
– t b t′ if t = t′,
– t b [t1, . . . , tn] if (t b t1 ∨ . . . ∨ t b tn),
– t b [t′]k if (t b t′),
– t b t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn if (t b t1) ∨ . . . ∨ (t b tn).
Notice that an interm is also a subterm, but a subterm is not necessarily an
interm. For instance, na is an interm and a subterm of na ⊕ [a]→nb , while nb is a
subterm, but not an interm.
Interms are useful in referring to the plain text of encryptions or everything
that can be “read” by the recipient of a term. Contrast these with the keys of
encrypted terms, which can only be confirmed by decrypting with the corre-
sponding inverses, but cannot be read (unless included in the plain-text).
Assumption 1 If P is a protocol, then, there is no term of P with a long-term
key as an interm:
(∀t ∈ SubTerms(P ))((@t′ b t)(t′ ∈ LTKeys(P ))).
It turns out that this assumption is not sufficient. As noted by an anonymous
reviewer of this workshop, we also need another assumption that if a variable
is used as a subterm of a key, then there should be no message in which that
variable is sent in plain (since a long-term shared-key could be substituted to
the variable as a way around the previous assumption).
Hence, we state our next assumption as follows:
Assumption 2 If [t]k is a subterm of a protocol, then no interm of k is an
interm of the protocol:
(∀[t]k ∈ SubTerms(P ))((@X b k; t′ ∈ SubTerms(P ))(X b t′)).
Next, we will make some assumptions on the initial intruder knowledge. We
will denote the set of terms known to the intruder before protocols are run, IIK .
We will first formalize the assumption that he knows the public-keys of all the
agents:
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Assumption 3 (∀x ∈ Constants)(pk(x) ∈ IIK ).
In addition, we will also assume that the attacker knows the values of all the
constants that were substituted by honest agents for all the non-fresh variables
(e.g. agent identities a, b etc.), when they form semi-strands:
Assumption 4 Let P be a protocol. Then,
(∀x/X ∈ σ; r ∈ P )
((
semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ (rσ ∈ S)∧
(x ∈ Constants) ∧ (X /∈ FreshVars(P ))
)
⇒ (x ∈ IIK )
)
.
Finally, we make another conventional assumption about protocols, namely
that honest agents do not reuse fresh values such as nonces and session-keys:
Assumption 5 Let S1, S2 be two different semi-bundles. Then,
FreshCons(S1) ∩ FreshCons(S2) = {}.
2.3 Constraints and Satisfiability
In this section, we will formalize the concepts given in [10,11] to generate sym-
bolic constraints from node interleavings of semi-bundles and the application of
reduction rules to determine satisfiability of those constraints.
Definition 4. [Constraints, Constraint sequences] A constraint is a tuple
〈m, T 〉 denoted m : T , where m is a term called the target and T is a set of
terms called the term set. If S is a semi-bundle, then, cs is a constraint sequence
of S, or conseq(cs, S) if every target term in cs is from a − node of S and every
term in every term set in cs is from a + node of S.
A constraint sequence cs is simple or simple(cs) if all the targets are vari-
ables. Constraint c is an “active constraint” of a constraint sequence cs (denoted
act(c, cs)) if all its prior constraints in cs, but not itself, are simple constraints.
We denote the sequences before and after the active constraint of a sequence cs
as cs< and cs> respectively.
In Table 1, we define a set of symbolic reduction rules, Rules, that can be
applied on the active constraint of a constraint sequence.
concat [t1, . . . , tn] : T t1 : T ,. . . ,tn : T split t : T ∪ [t1, . . . , tn] t : T ∪ t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn
penc [m]→k : T k : T,m : T pdec m : [t]
→
pk() ∪ T m : t ∪ T
senc [m]↔k : T k : T,m : T sdec m : [t]
↔
k ∪ T k : T,m : T ∪ {t, k}
xorr m : T ∪ t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T, xorl t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T ,
m : T ∪ t1 t1 : T
Table 1. Set of reduction rules, Rules
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The first column is the name of the rule, the second and third columns are
the active constraints before and after the application of the rule.
We define a predicate appl() on each of these rules, that is true if the rule
under consideration is applicable on the active constraint of the given constraint
sequence. The predicate takes the name of the rule, the input sequence cs, the
output sequence cs′, input substitution σ, output substitution σ′, and the theory
Th considered as arguments. For instance, we define xorr as follows
1:
appl(xorr, cs, cs
′, σ, σ′,Th)⇔ (∃m,T, t)
(
act(m : T ∪ t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn, cs) ∧ (σ′ = σ)∧
(cs′ = cs_< [t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn : T,m : T ∪ t1]_cs>)
)
We left out two important rules in the table, un and ksub, that change the
attacker substitution through unification. We describe them next:
appl(un, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,Th)⇔ (∃m,T, t)
(
act(m : T ∪ t, cs) ∧ (cs′ = cs<τ_cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ UE({m ?=E t}))
)
appl(ksub, cs, cs′, σ, σ′,Th)⇔ (∃m,T, t)
act(m : T ∪ [t]→k , cs)∧(cs′ = cs<τ_[mτ : Tτ ∪ [t]→k τ ]_cs>τ)∧
(σ′ = σ ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ UE({k ?=E pk()}))

(Note:  is a constant of type Agent representing the name of the attacker).
We will say that a constraint sequence cs′ is a child constraint sequence of
another sequence cs, if it can be obtained after applying some reduction rules
on cs:
childseq(cs, cs′,Th)⇔ (∃r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules)
appl(r1, cs, cs1, σ, σ1,Th)∧appl(r2, cs1, cs2, σ1, σ2,Th) ∧ . . .∧
appl(rn, csn−1, cs′, σn−1, σn,Th)
 .
We now define “normal” constraint sequences, where the active constraint
does not have sequences on the target or in the term set and has stand-alone
variables in the term set (also recall that by definition, the target term of an
active constraint is not a variable):
normal(cs)⇔

act(m : T, cs)∧
(@t1, . . . , tn)([t1, . . . , tn] = m)∧
((∀t ∈ T )((@t1, . . . , tn)([t1, . . . , tn] = t))∧
(∀t ∈ T )(t /∈ Vars))

Next, we will define a recursive function, normalize(), that maps constraints
to constraint sequences such that:
normalize(m : T ) = [m : T ], if normal(m : T );
= normalize(t1 : T )
_ . . ._ normalize(tn : T ) if m = [t1, . . . , tn];
= normalize(m : T ′ ∪ t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn) if T = T ′ ∪ [t1, . . . , tn].
1 _ is the sequence concatenation operator.
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We will now overload this function to apply it on constraint sequences as
well:
normalize(cs) = cs, if normal(cs)
= cs_< normalize(c)
_cs>, if act(c, cs).
We define satisfiability of constraints as a predicate “satisfiable” which is true
if there is a sequence of applicable rules which reduce a given normal constraint
sequence cs to a simple constraint sequence csn, in a theory Th, resulting in a
substitution σn:
satisfiable(cs, σn,Th)⇒
(∃r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules)

appl(r1, cs, cs1, {}, σ1,Th)∧
appl(r2, cs
′
1, cs2, σ1, σ2,Th) ∧ . . .∧
appl(rn, cs
′
n−1, csn, σn−1, σn,Th)∧
simple(csn)∧
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(cs′i = normalize(csi))
 . (1)
Notice the last clause which requires that every constraint sequence be nor-
malized before any rule is applied, when checking for satisfiability.
This definition of satisfiability may seem unusual, especially for the puritans,
since satisfiability is usually defined using attacker capabilities as operators on
sets of ground terms to generate each target on constraints.
However, it was proven in [11] that the decision procedure on which our
definition is based, is sound and complete with respect to attacker capabilities
on ground terms in the presence of the algebraic properties of XOR. Hence, we
defined it directly in terms of the decision procedure, since that is what we will be
using to prove our main theorem. We refer the interested reader to [10] and [11]
for more details on the underlying attacker operators, whose usage is equated to
the decision procedure that we have used.
Note also that our definition only captures completeness of the decision pro-
cedure wrt satisfiability, not soundness, since that is the only aspect we need for
our proofs in this paper.
2.4 Security properties and attacks
Every security protocol is designed to achieve certain security goals such as key
establishment and authentication. Correspondingly, every execution of a proto-
col is expected to satisfy some related security properties. For instance, a key
establishment protocol should not leak the key being established, which would be
a violation of secrecy. It should also not lead an honest agent to exchange a key
with an attacker, which would be a violation of both secrecy and authentication.
Our main result is general and is valid for any trace property such as secrecy,
that can be tested by embedding the desired property into semi-bundles and
then checking if constraint sequences from the semi-bundles are satisfiable:
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Definition 5. [Secrecy]
A protocol is secure for secrecy in the theory Th, if no constraint sequence
from any semi-bundle of the protocol is satisfiable, after a strand with node that
receives a secret constant is added to the semi-bundle. i.e., if P is a protocol,
then,
(@sec, cs, S)

semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S)∧
(cs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
(sec ∈ SecCons(S))∧
satisfiable(cs_[sec : T ], σ,Th)
⇔ secureForSecrecy(P,Th).
2.5 Main Requirement - µ-NUT
We now formulate our main requirement on protocol messages to prevent multi-
protocol attacks, namely µ-NUT, in the S∪A theory (an abbreviation for STD∪
ACUN). The requirement is an extension of Guttman-Thayer’s suggestion to
make encrypted terms distinguishable across protocols, to include XOR as well.
We will first define a set XorTerms as:
{t | (∃t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F,Vars))(t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn = t)}.
We will also define a function EncSubt() that returns all the encrypted sub-
terms of a set of terms. i.e., If T is a set of terms, then, EncSubt(T ) is the set
of all terms such that if t belongs to the set, then t must be a subterm of T and
is an encryption:
EncSubt(T ) = {t | (∃t′, k′)((t = [t′]k′) ∧ (t ∈ SubTerms(T )))}.
Further, if P is a protocol, then
EncSubt(P ) = {t | t ∈ EncSubt(SubTerms(P ))}.
We are now ready to state the main requirement formally:
Definition 6. [µ-NUT]
Two protocols P1 and P2 are µ-NUT-Satisfying, i.e., µ-NUT-Satisfying(P1, P2)
iff:
1. Encrypted subterms in both protocols are not STD-Unifiable after applying
any substitutions to them:
(∀t1 ∈ EncSubt(P1), t2 ∈ EncSubt(P2))((@σ1, σ2)(t1σ1 =STD t2σ2)).
2. Subterms of XOR-terms of one protocol (that are not XOR-terms themselves),
are not STD-Unifiable with any subterms of XOR-terms of the other protocol
(that are not XOR-terms as well):(∀t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tn ∈ SubTerms(P1),
t′1 ⊕ . . .⊕ t′n ∈ SubTerms(P2); t, t′
) (t ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}) ∧ (t′ ∈ {t′1, . . . , t′n})(t1, . . . , tn, t′1, . . . , t′n /∈ XorTerms)∧
⇒ ( 6 ∃σ, σ′)(tσ =STD t′σ′)
 .
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The first requirement is the same as Guttman-Thayer suggestion. The second
requirement extends it to the case of XOR-terms, which is our stated extension
in this paper.
The NSL⊕ protocol can be transformed to suit this requirement by tagging
its encrypted messages as follows:
Msg 1. A→ B : [nsl⊕, NA, A]pk(B)
Msg 2. B → A : [nsl⊕, [nsl⊕, NA]⊕ [nsl⊕, B], NB ]pk(A)
Msg 3. A→ B : [nsl⊕, NB ]pk(B)
The constant “nsl⊕” inside the encryptions can be encoded using some suit-
able bit-encoding when the protocol is implemented. Obviously, other protocols
must have their encrypted subterms start with the names of those protocols.
3 A Lynchpin Lemma
In this section, we provide a useful lemma that is the lynchpin in achieving our
main result. We prove in the lemma that, if we follow BSCA for (S ∪ A)-UPs
that do not have XOR terms with variables, their ACUN subproblems will have
only constants as subterms.
Lemma 1. [ACUN UPs have only constants]
Let Γ = {m ?=S∪A t} be a (S∪A)-UP that is (S∪A)-Unifiable, and where no
subterm of m or t is an XOR term with free variables2:
(∀x)
(
((x @ m) ∨ (x @ t)) ∧ (n ∈ N)∧
(x = x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn) ⇒ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(xi /∈ Vars)
)
.
Then,
(∀m′ ?=ACUN t′ ∈ Γ5.2; y)
((
((y @ m′) ∨ (y @ t′))∧
(m′ =ACUN t′)
)
⇒ (y ∈ Constants)
)
.
Proof. Please see Appendix B, Lemma 2.
4 Main result - µ-NUT prevents multi-protocol attacks
We will now prove that µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to multi-
protocol attacks.
The idea is to show that if a protocol is secure in isolation, then it is in
combination with other protocols with whom it is µ-NUT-Satisfying .
To show this, we will achieve a contradiction by attempting to prove the
contrapositive. i.e., if there is a breach of secrecy for a protocol in combination
with another protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying , then it must also have
a breach of secrecy in isolation.
We assume that the reader is familiar with BSCA (detailed description in
Appendix A).
2 N is the set of natural numbers.
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Theorem 1. If a protocol is secure for secrecy, then it remains so in combina-
tion with any other protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying.
Proof. Suppose P1 is a protocol that is secure for secrecy in isolation in the S∪A
theory. i.e., secureForSecrecy(P1,S∪A). Consider another protocol P2 such that,
µ-NUT-Satisfying(P1, P2). Let, S1 and S2 be two semi-bundles from P1 and P2
respectively:
semi-bundle(S1, P1) ∧ semi-bundle(S2, P2).
Consider a constraint sequence combcs from Scomb = S1 ∪ S2. i.e.,
conseq(combcs, Scomb).
Consider another constraint sequence isocs, where,
(a) Targets in combcs are targets in isocs if the targets belong to S1:
(∀m : in combcs)((m ∈ Terms(S1))⇒ (m : in isocs)). (2)
(b) Term sets in combcs are term sets in isocs but without terms from S2:
(∀m1 : T1,
m2 : T2 in combcs
)
m1 : T1 ≺combcs m2 : T2
⇒
(∃T ′1, T ′2)
 (m1 : T ′1 ≺isocs m1 : T ′2)∧(T ′1 = T1 \ T ′′1 ) ∧ (T ′2 = T2 \ T ′′2 )
(∀t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T ′′2 )(t ∈ SubTerms(S2))

 .
(3)
Then, from Def. 4 (Constraints) we have: conseq(isocs, S1).
Suppose combcs and isocs are normalized. To achieve a contradiction, let
there be a violation of secrecy in Scomb s.t. combcs is satisfiable after an artificial
constraint with a secret constant of S1, say sec, is added to it:
(combcs = [ : , . . . , : T ]) ∧ satisfiable(combcs_[sec : T ], ,S ∪ A). (4)
Suppose [r1, . . . , rn] = R, such that r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rules. Then, from the defi-
nition of satisfiability (1), using R, say we have:

(combcs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
appl(r1, combcs
_[sec : T ], combcs1, {}, σ1,S ∪ A)∧
appl(r2, combcs
′
1, combcs2, σ1, σ2,S ∪ A) ∧ . . .∧
appl(rn, combcs
′
n−1, combcsn, σn−1, σn,S ∪ A)∧
simple(combcsn) ∧ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(combcs ′i = normalize(combcsi))
 . (5)
From their descriptions, every rule in Rules adds subterms of existing terms
(if any) in the target or term set of the active constraint:
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(
appl( , cs, cs′, , , ) ∧ act(m : T, cs)∧
act(m′ : T ′, cs′) ∧ (x ∈ T ′ ∪ {m′})
)
⇒ (x ∈ SubTerms(T ∪ {m})). (6)
Since every combcs ′i (i = 1 to n) in (5) is normalized, and since P1 and P2
are µ-NUT-Satisfying , we have:
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n};∃p ∈ N; t1, . . . , tp)
 act(m : T, combcs ′i)∧(t1 ⊕ . . .⊕ tp ∈ T ∪ {m})⇒
(∀j ∈ {1, . . . , p})(tj /∈ Vars)
 . (7)
Suppose chcombcs is a normal, child constraint sequence of combcs and
chisocs is a normal, child constraint sequence of isocs.
Now all the rules in Rules are applicable on the target of the active constraint
of chisocs, if they were on chcombcs, provided they are applied on a term of S1:
(∀r ∈ Rules)
 appl(r, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, , ,S ∪ A)∧act(m : , chcombcs) ∧ act(m′ : , chcombcs ′)∧
act(m : , chisocs)
⇒(
appl(r, chisocs, chisocs ′, , ,S ∪ A) ∧ act(m′ : , chisocs ′) ) . (8)
Similarly, all rules that are applicable on a term in the term set of the active
constraint in chcombcs, say c, are also applicable on the same term of the active
constraint in chisocs, say c′ (provided the term exists in the term set of c′, which
it does from (3) and (6)):
(∀r ∈ Rules)
 appl(r, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, , ,S ∪ A)∧act( : ∪ t, chcombcs) ∧ act( : ∪ T ′, chcombcs ′)∧
act( : ∪ t, chisocs)
⇒(
appl(r, chisocs, chisocs ′, , ,S ∪ A) ∧ act( : ∪ T ′, chisocs ′) ) . (9)
un and ksub are the only rules that affect the attacker substitution. We will
show that these are equally applicable on chcombcs and chisocs as well. Suppose:
– Γ = {m ?=S∪A t}, is a (S ∪ A)-UP and suppose m = m′σcomb , t = t′σcomb ,
where m′ ∈ SubTerms(S1);
– Variables in σcomb are substituted with terms from the same semi-bundle:
(∀x/X ∈ σcomb)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))). (10)
– Γ is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable.
Let τ ∈ US∪A(Γ ) and let ATh denote a Th-UA. Using Def. 7 (Combined
Unifier), say we have that τ ∈ τSTD  τACUN where τSTD ∈ ASTD(Γ5.1) and
τACUN ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
Now from BSCA, if m1
?
=STD t1 ∈ Γ5.1, and ρ ∈ USTD(m1 ?=STD t1), then we
have the following cases:
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Variables. If m1, and/or t1 are variables, from (7) and BSCA, they are necessar-
ily new i.e., m1, t1 ∈ Vars \ Vars(Γ ) (unless m and t are variables, which they
are not, since chcombcs is normal). Hence, there are no new substitutions in ρ
to Vars(Γ ) in this case.
Constants. If m1 ∈ Constants(S1), again from BSCA, t1 cannot belong to Vars,
and it must be a constant. If m1 is a fresh constant of S1, then t1 must also
belong to S1 from the freshness assumption (5) and (10), and if m1 is not fresh,
t1 could belong to either SubTerms(S1) or IIK from Assumption 4. Further,
ρ = {}.
Public Keys. If m1 = pk( ), then t1 must be some pk( ) as well. From BSCA,
m1 cannot be such that [ ]
→
m1 @ m. Further, there cannot be an XOR term, say
. . .⊕m1 ⊕ . . . that is a subterm of m, from µ-NUT Condition 2. The only other
possibility is that m = m1. In that case, t must also equal t1, whence, t can
belong to IIK from assumption 3 (Intruder possesses all public-keys). Hence,
(∀x/X ∈ ρ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))).
Encrypted Subterms. Supposem1 = m11σcomb , t1 = t11σcomb ,m11, t11 ∈ EncSubt(S1∪
S2). Then, from µ-NUT Condition 1 and (6), we have, m11, t11 ∈ EncSubt(Si),
where i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, (∀x/X ∈ ρ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))).
Sequences. If m1 is a sequence, either m must be a sequence, or there must
be some . . . ⊕ m1 ⊕ . . . belonging to SubTerms({m, t}), from BSCA. But m
and t cannot be sequences, since chcombcs is normal. Hence, by µ-NUT Condi-
tion 2 and (6), m1, t1 ∈ SubTerms(Si)σcomb , i ∈ {1, 2} and (∀x/X ∈ ρ)((∃i ∈
{1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))).
In summary, we make the following observations about problems in Γ5.1.
If m1 is an instantiation of a subterm in S1, then so is t1, or t1 belongs to
IIK :
(∀m1 ?=STD t1 ∈ Γ5.1)(m1 ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcomb ⇒ t1 ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcomb∪IIK ).
(11)
Every substitution in τSTD has both its term and variable from the same
semi-bundle:
(∀x/X ∈ τSTD)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si))). (12)
Now consider the UPs in Γ5.2. Applying (7) into Lemma 1, we have that
τACUN = {}. Combining this with (12), we have:
(∀x/X ∈ τ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x,X ∈ SubTerms(Si)σcomb)). (13)
Suppose m = m1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ mp and t = t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tq; p, q ≥ 1, x = mτ ,
y = tτ and m′′ =S∪A x where m′′ = m′1 ⊕ . . .⊕m′p′ , s.t. (∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p′})(i 6=
j ⇒ m′iτ 6=S∪A m′jτ) and t′′ =S∪A y, where t′′ = t′1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ t′q′ , s.t. (∀i, j ∈
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{1, . . . , q′})(i 6= j ⇒ t′iτ 6=S∪A t′jτ). Informally, this means that, no two terms in
{m′1, . . . ,m′p′} or {t′1, . . . , t′q′} can be cancelled.
Suppose Γψ = Γ5.1, where ψ is a set of substitutions. Then, mτ =S∪A tτ
implies, (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p′})((∃j ∈ {1, . . . , q′})(m′iτψ =STD t′jτψ)) with p′ = q′.
From (11), this means that m ∈ SubTerms(S1)σcomb implies, t also belongs to
SubTerms(S1)σcomb or IIK .
Now since Vars(m′)∪Vars(t′) ⊂ Vars(S1), we have, m′σcomb = m′σiso , and
t′σcomb = t′σiso , where σcomb = σiso∪{x/X | x,X ∈ SubTerms(S2)}. Combining
this with (13), we have that, m′σcombτ =S∪A t′σcombτ ⇒ m′σisoτ =S∪A t′σisoτ .
Combining these with (2) and (3), we can now write:
(∀chcombcs, chisocs)

childseq(chcombcs, combcs,S ∪ A)∧
childseq(chisocs, isocs,S ∪ A)∧
appl(un, chcombcs, chcombcs ′, σcomb , σ′comb ,S ∪ A)⇒
appl(un, chisocs, chisocs ′, σiso , σ′iso ,S ∪ A)
 .
(14)
where, the active constraint in chcombcs and chisocs only differ in the term
sets:act(m : ∪ t, combcs) ∧ act(m : ∪ t, isocs)∧(combcs ′ = combcs<τ_combcs>τ) ∧ (isocs ′ = isocs<τ_isocs>τ)∧
(σ′comb = σcomb ∪ τ) ∧ (σ′iso = σiso ∪ τ) ∧ (τ ∈ (S ∪ A)-mgu(〈m, t〉))

Finally, we can combine, (5), (8), (9), and (14) to infer:

(isocs = 〈 : , . . . , : T 〉) ∧ appl(r1, isocs_[sec : T ], isocs1, {}, σ1,S ∪ A)∧
appl(r2, isocs
′
1, isocs2, σ1, σ2,S ∪ A) ∧ . . .∧
appl(rp, isocs
′
p−1, isocsp, σp−1, σp,S ∪ A)∧
simple(isocsp) ∧ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p})(isocs ′i = normalize(isocsi))
 .
(15)
where [r1, . . . , rp] is a subsequence
3 of R (defined in 5).
This in turn implies satisfiable(isocs_sec : T, σp,S∪A) from the definition of
satisfiability.
We can then combine this with the fact that S1 is a semi-bundle of P1, and
isocs is a constraint sequence of S1 and conclude:
semi-bundle(S1, P1) ∧ conseq(isocs, S1) ∧ (isocs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧
satisfiable(isocs_[sec : T ], σp,S ∪ A).
But from Definition 5 (Secrecy), this implies, ¬secureForSecrecy(P1,S ∪ A),
a contradiction to the hypothesis. Hence, P1 is always secure for secrecy in the
(S ∪ A) theory, in combination with P2 with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying .
3 s′ is a subsequence of a sequence s, if s = _s′_ .
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a formal proof that tagging to ensure non-unifiability
of distinct encryptions prevents multi-protocol attacks under the ACUN proper-
ties induced by the Exclusive-OR operator. We will now discuss some prospects
for future work and related work.
5.1 Future work
Other equational theories can be handled in the same way as the ACUN theory:
When we use BSCA, the UPs for them (Γ5.2) will only have constants as sub-
terms. Hence, unifiers only from the algorithms for standard theory problems
need to be considered for µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols. Of course, this reasoning
has to be given within a symbolic constraint solving model that takes the addi-
tional equational theories into account (the model we used, adapted from [11],
was tailored to accommodate only ACUN).
We achieved our main result specifically for secrecy. The reason for this was
that, in order to prove that attacks exist in isolation if there did in combination,
we had to have a precise definition as to what an “attack” was to begin with.
However, other properties such as authentication and observational equivalence
can be considered on a case-by-case basis, with a similar proof pattern.
At the core of our proofs is the use of BSCA for combined theory unification.
However, BSCA is applicable only for disjoint theories that do not share any
operators. For instance, the algorithm cannot consider equations of the form,
[a, b]⊕ [c, d] = [a⊕ c, b⊕ d].
We plan to expand our proofs to include such equations in future, possibly
with the help of new unification algorithms [12].
5.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the consideration of algebraic properties and/or
equational theories for protocol independence is unchartered waters.
A study of multi-protocol attacks with the perfect encryption assumption re-
laxed was first reported by Malladi et al. in [13] through “multi-protocol guess-
ing attacks” on password protocols. Delaune et al. proved that these can be
prevented by tagging in [14].
The original work of Guttman et al. in [1] assumed that protocols have no
type-flaw attacks when they proved that tagging to ensure disjoint encryption
prevents multi-protocol attacks. But a recent work by Guttman seems to relax
that assumption [15]. Both [1] and [15] use the strand space model [7]. Our
protocol model in this paper is also based on strand spaces, but the penetra-
tor actions are modeled as symbolic reduction rules in the constraint solving
algorithm of [11,10], as opposed to penetrator strands in [7]. Cortier-Delaune
also prove that multi-protocol attacks can be prevented with tagging, which is
slightly different from [1] and considers composed/non-atomic keys [16]. They
too seem to use the constraints model as their protocol framework.
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In [17], we prove the decidability of tagged protocols that use XOR with the
underlying framework of [11] which extends [10] with XOR. That work is similar
to our proofs, since we too used the same framework ([11]). Further, we use
BSCA [6] as a core aspect of this paper along the lines of [17]. Recently, we used
a similar proof pattern to prove that tagging prevents type-flaw attacks under
XOR and most likely under other equational theories in [18]. Lemma 1 in the
current paper was also the lynchpin in [18].
In [19], Kuesters and Truderung showed that the verification of protocols
that use the XOR operator can be reduced to verification in a free term algebra,
for a special class of protocols called ⊕-linear protocols4, so that ProVerif can be
used for verification. Chen et al. recently report some extensions to Kuesters-
Truderung’s work [20].
These results have a similarity with ours, in the sense that we too show
that the algebraic properties of XOR have no effect when some of the messages
are modified. However, we believe that our result is more general than these,
since any protocol can be tagged to satisfy our requirements, but not necessarily
⊕-linearity.
Acknowledgments. I am thankful to Yannick Chevalier for explaining his protocol
model in [11], Pascal Lafourcade for many useful remarks and the anonymous
reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
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A Bader & Schulz Combined Theory Unification
Algorithm (BSCA)
We will now consider how two UAs for two disjoint theories Th1 and Th2 respec-
tively, may be combined to output the unifiers for UPs made using operators
from Th1 ∪ Th2 using Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [6].
We first need some definitions. Suppose F is a signature for a set of identities
E and let Th denote the theory =E . Then, a term is pure wrt Th iff every subterm
of it is an F -term. i.e.,
pure(t,Th)⇔ (∀t′ @ t)((∃f ∈ F )(t′ = f( , . . . , ))).
We define a predicate ast (alien subterm) on terms such that, a term t′ is an
alien subterm of another term t wrt the theory Th, if it is a subterm of t, but is
not pure wrt Th:
(∀t, t′,Th)(ast(t′, t,Th)⇔ (t′ @ t) ∧ ¬pure(t′,Th)).
For instance, [1, na⊕B,A]→pk(B) has na⊕B as an alien subterm with respect
to the theory STD.
We will use the following (STD ∪ ACUN)-UP as our running example5:{
[1, na]pk(B)
?
=STD∪ACUN [1, NB ]pk(a) ⊕ [2, A]⊕ [2, b]
}
.
BSCA takes as input a (Th1∪Th2)-UP, say Γ , and applies some transforma-
tions on them to derive Γ5.1 and Γ5.2 that are Th1-UP and Th2-UP respectively.
Step 1 (Purify terms) BSCA first “purifies” the given set of (Th = Th1 ∪
Th2)-UP, Γ , into a new set of problems Γ1, such that, all the terms are pure wrt
Th1 or Th2.
If our running example was Γ , then, the set of problems in Γ1 are W
?
=STD
[1, na]pk(B), X
?
=STD [1, NB ]pk(a), Y
?
=STD [2, A], Z
?
=STD [2, b], and W
?
=ACUN
X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z, where W,X, Y, Z are obviously new variables that did not exist in
Γ .
Step 2. (Purify problems) Next, BSCA purifies Γ1 into Γ2 such that, every
problem in Γ2 has both terms pure wrt the same theory.
For our example problem, this step can be skipped since all the problems in
Γ1 already have both their terms purely from the same theory (STD or ACUN)).
5 We omit the superscript→ on encrypted terms in this problem, since they obviously
use only asymmetric encryption.
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Step 3. (Variable identification) Next, BSCA partitions Vars(Γ2) into a
partition VarIdP such that, each variable in Γ2 is replaced with a representative
from the same equivalence class in VarIdP . The result is Γ3.
In our example problem, one set of values for VarIdP can be
{{A}, {B}, {NB}, {W}, {X}, {Y,Z}} .
Step 4. (Split the problem) The next step of BSCA is to split Γ3 into two
UPs Γ4.1 and Γ4.2 such that, each of them has every problem with terms from
the same theory, Th1 or Th2.
Following this in our example,
Γ4.1 =
{
W
?
=STD [1, na]pk(B), X
?
=STD [1, NB ]pk(a), Y
?
=STD [2, A], Z
?
=STD [2, b]
}
,
and
Γ4.2 =
{
W
?
=ACUN X ⊕ Y ⊕ Y
}
.
Step 5. (Solve systems) The penultimate step of BSCA is to partition all the
variables in Γ3 into a size of two: Let p = {V1, V2} is a partition of Vars(Γ3).
Then, the earlier problems (Γ4.1, Γ4.2) are further split such that, all the variables
in one set of the partition are replaced with new constants in the other set and
vice-versa. The resulting sets are Γ5.1 and Γ5.2.
In our sample problem, we can form {V1, V2} as {Vars(Γ3), {}}. i.e., we choose
that all the variables in problems of Γ5.2 be replaced with new constants. This
is required to find the unifier for the problem (this is the partition that will
successfully find a unifier).
So Γ5.1 stays the same as Γ4.1, but Γ5.2 is changed to
Γ5.2 = Γ4.2β =
{
W
?
=ACUN X ⊕ Y ⊕ Y
}
β =
{
w
?
=ACUN x⊕ y ⊕ y
}
.
i.e., β = {w/W, x/X, y/Y }, where, w, x, y are constants, which obviously did
not appear in Γ5.1.
Step 6. (Combine unifiers) The final step of BSCA is to combine the unifiers
for Γ5.1 and Γ5.2, obtained using ATh1 and ATh2 :
Definition 7. [Combined Unifier]
Let Γ be a Th-UP where (Th1 ∪ Th2) = Th. Let σi ∈ AThi(Γ5.i), i ∈ {1, 2}
and let Vi = Vars(Γ5.i), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Suppose ‘<’ is a linear order on Vars(Γ ) such that Y < X if X is not a
subterm of an instantiation of Y :
(∀X,Y ∈ Vars(Γ ))((Y < X)⇒ (6 ∃σ)(X @ Y σ)).
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Let least(X,T,<) be defined as the minimal element of set T , when ordered
linearly by the relation ‘<’. i.e.,
least(X,T,<)⇔ (∀Y ∈ T )((Y 6= X)⇒ (X < Y )).
Then, the combined UA for Γ , namely ATh1∪Th2 , is defined such that,
ATh1∪Th2(Γ ) = {σ | (∃σ1, σ2)((σ = σ1σ2)∧(σ1 ∈ ATh1(Γ5.1))∧(σ2 ∈ ATh2(Γ5.2)))}.
where, if σ = σ1  σ2, then,
– The substitution in σ for the least variable in V1 and V2 is from σ1 and σ2
respectively:
(∀i ∈ {1, 2})((X ∈ Vi) ∧ least(X,Vars(Γ ), <)⇒ (Xσ = Xσi)); and
– For all other variables X, where each Y with Y < X has a substitution al-
ready defined, define Xσ = Xσiσ (i ∈ {1, 2}):
(∀i ∈ {1, 2})((∀X ∈ Vi)((∀Y )((Y < X) ∧ (∃Z)(Z/Y ∈ σ))) ⇒ (Xσ =
Xσiσ)).
B Proofs
The following lemma concerns combined unification problems involving STD
and ACUN theories. We prove that, if we follow Bader & Schulz approach for
finding unifiers for these problems, ACUN subproblems will have only constants
as subterms. Consequently, we will end up in an empty set of substitutions
returned by the ACUN UA for the ACUN UPs, even when the XOR terms are
equal in the ACUN theory.
Lemma 2. [ACUN UPs have only constants]
Let Γ = {m ?=S∪A t} be a (S∪A)-UP that is (S∪A)-Unifiable, and where no
subterm of m or t is an XOR term with free variables6:
(∀x)
(
((x @ m) ∨ (x @ t)) ∧ (n ∈ N)∧
(x = x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn) ⇒ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(xi /∈ Vars)
)
.
Then,
(∀m′ ?=ACUN t′ ∈ Γ5.2; y)
((
((y @ m′) ∨ (y @ t′))∧
(m′ =ACUN t′)
)
⇒ (y ∈ Constants)
)
.
6 N is the set of natural numbers.
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Proof. Let σ be a set of substitutions s.t. σ ∈ A(S∪A)(Γ ).
Then, from Def. 7 (Combined Unifier), σ ∈ σ1σ2, where σ1 ∈ ASTD(Γ5.1)
and σ2 ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
Suppose there is a term t in Γ with an alien subterm t′ wrt the theory ACUN
(e.g. [1, na]
→
k ⊕ b⊕ c with the alien subterm of [1, na]→k ).
Then, from the definition of Γ2, it must have been replaced with a new
variable in Γ2. i.e.,
(∀t, t′)
((
(t ∈ Γ ) ∧ (t = ⊕ . . .⊕ )∧
(t′ @ t) ∧ ast(t′, t,ACUN)
)
⇒ (∃X)
(
(X
?
=ACUN t
′ ∈ Γ2)∧
(X ∈ NewVars)
))
.
(16)
where NewVars ⊂ Vars \Vars(Γ ).
Since XOR terms do not have free variables from hypothesis, it implies that
every free variable in an XOR term in Γ2 is a new variable:
(∀t, t′)
((
(t ∈ Γ2) ∧ pure(t,ACUN)∧
(t′ @ t) ∧ (t′ ∈ Vars)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars)
)
. (17)
Since every alien subterm of every term in Γ has been replaced with a new
variable (16), combining it with (17), XOR terms in Γ2 must now have only
constants and/or new variables:
(∀t, t′)
((
pure(t,ACUN)∧
(t ∈ Γ2) ∧ (t′ @ t)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars ∪ Constants)
)
. (18)
Let VarIdP be a partition of Vars(Γ2) and Γ3 = Γ2ρ, such that
Γ2ρ = {s ?=ACUN t | (s ?=ACUN t := s′ρ ?=ACUN t′ρ) ∧ s′ ?=ACUN t′ ∈ Γ}
where ρ is the set of substitutions where each set of variables in VarIdP has
been replaced with one of the variables in the set:
ρ =
x/X |
 (∀Y1/X1, Y2/X2 ∈ ρ; vip ∈ VarIdP)
 (X1, X2 ∈ vip)⇒(Y1 = Y2)∧
(Y1, Y2 ∈ vip)
 .
Can there exist a substitution X/Y in ρ such that Y ∈ NewVars and X ∈
Vars(Γ )?
To find out, consider the following two statements:
– From (16), every new variable Y in Γ2 belongs to a STD-UP in Γ2:
(∀Y ∈ NewVars)((Y ∈ Vars(Γ2)⇒ (∃t)(pure(t, STD) ∧ Y ?=ACUN t ∈ Γ2))).
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– Further, from hypothesis, we have that XOR terms in Γ do not have free
variables. Hence, every free variable is a proper subterm7 of a purely STD
term:
(∀X ∈ Vars(Γ )) ( (∃t ∈ Γ )((X @ t) ∧ pure(t, STD) ∧ (X 6= t)) ) .
The above two statements are contradictory: It is not possible that a new
variable and an existing variable can be replaced with each other, since one
belongs to a STD-UP, and another is always a proper subterm of a term that
belongs to a STD-UP.
Hence, VarIdP cannot consist of sets where new variables are replaced by
Vars(Γ ). i.e.,
(@X,Y ; vip ∈ VarIdP)
(
(Y,X ∈ vip) ∧ (Y ∈ NewVars)∧
(X ∈ Vars(Γ )) ∧ (X/Y ∈ ρ)
)
(19)
Writing (19) in (18), we have,
(∀t, t′)
((
pure(t,ACUN)∧
(t ∈ Γ3) ∧ (t′ @ t)
)
⇒ (t′ ∈ NewVars ∪ Constants)
)
. (20)
Further, if a variable belongs to a UP of Γ3, then the other term of the UP
is pure wrt STD theory:
(∀X ∈ Vars(Γ3), t)
((
(X
?
=ACUN t ∈ Γ3)∨
(t
?
=ACUN X ∈ Γ3)
)
⇒ (X ∈ NewVars) ∧ pure(t,STD)
)
.
(21)
Now suppose Γ4.2 = {s ?=ACUN t | (s ?=ACUN t ∈ Γ3) ∧ pure(s,ACUN) ∧
pure(t,ACUN)}, {V1, V2} a partition of Vars(Γ ) ∪NewVars, and
Γ5.2 = Γ4.2β,
where, β is a set of substitutions of new constants to V1:
β = {x/X | (X ∈ V1) ∧ (x ∈ Constants \ (Constants(Γ ) ∪ Constants(Γ5.1)))}.
From hypothesis, Γ5.2 is ACUN-Unifiable. Hence, we have:
(∀σ)((∀m′ ?=ACUN t′ ∈ Γ5.2)(m′σ =ACUN t′σ)⇔ σ ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2)).
Now consider a σ s.t. σ ∈ AACUN(Γ5.2).
From (20), we have that XOR terms in Γ5.2 have only new variables and/or
constants and from (21) we have that if X ∈ Vars(Γ5.2), then there exists t s.t.
X
?
=STD t ∈ Γ5.1 and t is pure wrt STD theory.
7 t is a proper subterm of t′ if t @ t′ ∧ t 6= t′.
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Suppose V2 6= {}. Then, there is at least one variable, say X ∈ Vars(Γ5.2).
This implies that X is replaced with a constant (say x) in Γ5.1.
Since X is necessarily a new variable and one term of a STD-UP, this implies
that x must equal some compound term made with StdOps.
However, a compound term made with StdOps can never equal a constant
under the STD theory:
( 6 ∃f ∈ StdOps; t1, . . . , tn;x ∈ Constants)(x =STD f(t1, . . . , tn)),
a contradiction.
Hence, σ = {}, V2 = {} and our hypothesis is true that all XOR terms in Γ5.2
necessarily contain only constants:
(∀m′ ?=ACUN t′ ∈ Γ5.2;x)
(
(x @ m) ∨ (x @ t)⇒ (x ∈ Constants) ) .
